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The financial crisis has revealed fatal institutional and structural deficits at the finance market. 
Politics has reacted to the financial crisis with a sea of legal bills and regulations. But all regulat-
ing efforts are merely system-imminent reparation measures and do not solve the core prob-
lems. For this, a fundamental financial reform is needed. This article analyzes the finance sys-
tem’s shortcomings, documents the reform approaches from the past three years, and designs a 
base structure for modern finance architecture without banks.        
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Get rid of banks and build up a modern financial world! 
1. Introduction 
The crisis in the Euro-zone clearly shows that the “banking sector” is still a systemic risk for the 
whole economy. Although no way leads around a restructuring of Greek and Portuguese state 
debt, the EU financial politics recoils from such actions out of fear of the consequences for the 
European bank-system. What is publicized as “Euro-crisis” by politics and media is first and 
foremost a structural deficit within the European bank and finance system.  
The recent financial crisis has revealed fatal institutional and structural deficits at the finance 
market. Politics has reacted to the financial crisis with a sea of legal bills and regulations. But all 
regulating efforts are merely system-imminent reparation measures and do not solve the core 
problems. For this, a fundamental financial reform is needed. This article analyzes the finance 
system’s shortcomings, documents the reform approaches from the past three years, and de-
signs a base structure for modern finance architecture without banks.  
2. Insights from the financial crisis 
2.1. Herd behavior versus market efficiency 
In the past crisis, it was the American real estate prices, which developed into an “asset bub-
ble”. In the 167 systemic bank crises before, counted by Laeven and Valencia (2008) between 
1970 and 2007, it was an equally extreme increase in market prices, just in other asset markets. 
A “bubble” is a suitable metaphor for such a price rise, which is not based on fundamental fac-
tors. The increase is a mere exaggeration and is being produced by a massive inflow of capital. 
Several empirical studies prove that herd behavior of investors prevails in financial markets 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011a). The individual investor does not orient himself by the funda-
mental factors of his investment decision (return and risk), but rather orients primarily by other 
investors’ decisions, hoping, that they have advanced knowledge. Simplified, this behavior can 
be explained as follows: One only looks where the herd runs to, jumps on the same train as ear-
ly as possible and tries – and this is where the actual risk lies – not to miss take-off. Typically, the 
herd selects “small” markets, with a lesser liquidity and flexibility in supply. In the real estate 
market, for example, the increased demand cannot be satisfied by a short term increase of sup-
ply, so that the price rise is especially distinct here. Well suited, in this sense, are also commodi-
ty and food markets. Through the exaggeration prices distance themselves further and further 
from their economic “fair” value. In the real estate sector, the fair value of a house can be calcu-
lated without much difficulty. Usually, the average between its substance value (rebuilding 
costs) and its present value of expected returns is taken as a guideline. The speculative exagger-
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ation in the US-real estate market was therefore obvious to market participants, but neverthe-
less did not change their herd behavior.  
The history of banking crises and the prevailing behavior of investors in the financial market 
lead to conclude, that the paradigm of efficient markets, especially of efficient finance markets, 
is not valid anymore and probably never was. The, in the economic theory dominant rational 
investor, the so called “homo oeconomicus”, who with the help of all relevant information max-
imizes his expected profit, is ideal to represent human behavior in economic models, but does 
not exist in reality. The same can be said for the efficient market hypothesis developed by Fama 
(1970). The development of US real estate prices clearly shows, that market prices do not in-
clude all available information, and that the price is not – as postulated by Fama – always iden-
tical to the so called fair or fundamentally justified price. Herd behavior leads to extreme volatil-
ity and speculative bubbles. Furthermore there is no self-regulation mechanism of markets in a 
way that a speculative price increase would lead automatically to a decline in demand. The mar-
ket’s self-regulation, market equilibriums, and market prices, which enable an optimal allocation 
of scarce resources to market participants, are wishful thinking of the economic model world, 
which – at least in financial markets – is far from reality. 
2.2. The business model „bank“– a systemic risk 
The rescue of banks with tax money in the financial crisis was justified with the argument of 
“system relevance”. According to this the insolvency of banks up to a certain size and high inter-
connectedness endanger the entire finance system’s stability and must to that extent be res-
cued by the state. The finance system’s stability is a difficult to define term: primarily the danger 
of a domino effect is seen here, in the sense, that the collapse of a big bank endangers the li-
quidity of further banks in the finance system. With pending insolvency of one or more banks 
the economy’s credit supply is threatened. Meanwhile a “bank run” threatens to occur, mean-
ing that savers fear for the security of their deposits and withdraw them from the bank on short 
notice.  
The problem is that the knowledge about system relevance and public rescue in an emergency 
stimulates banks or bank management to take even greater risks as to receive greater returns. 
In case of a success, the bank generates higher profits and the management receives greater 
bonus payments. In the case of failure and the bank’s pending insolvency, the state covers the 
losses. Profits are privatized while losses are socialized. The best example for such a “moral haz-
ard behavior” by banks is the current crisis within the Euro zone. The status of a bank, due to its 
size and interconnectedness, to be considered as “system relevant”, is rather attractive. This 
reduces the bank’s credit risk substantially. Hence refinancing costs for raising capital are re-
duced, stock prices go up, and the unspoken-of public guarantee facilitates the acquisition of 
new wealthy customers with huge savings deposits (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010). Conse-
quently, in this case, for the bank management the false incentive to gain system relevance as 
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quickly as possible by acquiring other banks subsists, especially considering that bonus pay-
ments and managerial influence correlate positively with the bank’s size.  
The essential origin of the systemic risk lies within business model “bank” that has changed sig-
nificantly since the 1970’s. In former times commercial banks collect money from savers on the 
liability side and hand out loans to the real economy on the assets side of the balance sheet. But 
since the technique of securitization came up in the 70ies, banks started to convert loans with 
high volume into small pieces of tradable securities (bonds), which are sold to capital market 
investors. In the case of conventional lending, the bank as an intermediary bears the full credit 
risk, as well as the interest rate change risk. Wherefore, the bank has a genuine interest con-
cerning the selection of a creditworthy debtor. The securitization of loans, on the other hand, 
alters this state of interest fundamentally. Companies’ great volume loans, are converted into 
fragmented bonds by a consortium of several banks, and sold to institutional customers (insur-
ance companies, investment funds, banks, central banks, etc.) by telephone trading (“over-the-
counter business”), as well as to private customers through the network of affiliated banks. And 
so the bank degenerates to a mere merchant of securities and is risk-free again with the bonds’ 
successful placing on the capital market. Because now the bond investor bears the risks dis-
cussed above. The bank’s interest merely concerns maximizing sales of securities, and not any-
more the selection of a creditworthy debtor.  
The dominance of investment banking over the credit business is mirrored in the balance sheet 
as well as in the bank’s income statement. Holding of securities mainly for the bank’s propriety 
trading are the overriding part of bank assets. The fraction of account receivables out of lending 
activities measured by the bank’s total assets is much smaller in comparison (table 1).  
Table 1: Balance sheet and income statement positions exemplary for four European high street banks 
Source: The banks’ annual reports 2010 
Generally, the balance sheet volumes of banks have increased substantially over the past years, 
which was among others caused by the growing number of security holdings. In most European 
countries, the sum of national banks’ assets exceeds the gross domestic product (GDP) by far. In 
Bank Deutsche Bank UBS RBS BNP PARIBAS 
Balance sheet 2010 € million  CHF million  £ million € million  
Total Assets 1,905,630 100% 1,317,247 100% 1,452,634  100% 1,998,158 100% 
Securities/Derivatives 1,100,997 58% 781,255 59% 761,874  52% 1,064,232 53% 
Loans 407,729 21% 262,877 20% 560,657 39% 747,404 37% 
Income statement 2010         
Total operating income 27,293 100% 31,994 100% 32,662  100% 43,880 100% 
Net interest income after 
credit loss expense 
14,309 52% 6,149 19% 14,200  43% 24,060 55% 
Net fee and commission 
income 
10,669 39% 17,160 54% 5,983 18% 8,486 19% 
Net trading income 3,555 13% 7,471 23% 6,138  19% 4,657 11% 
Other income (loss) (1240) -5% 1,214 4% 6341 19% 5,773 13% 
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the income statement, the achieved interest rate margin (credit interest rate minus debit inter-
est rate) usually contributes yet 50% to the banks’ income. However, this profit is primarily gen-
erated through the acquisition of interest bearing bonds, and not through the credit business. 
Furthermore fees and commission generated by security sales and trading are becoming the 
main source of income for the business model “bank”. 
Due to securitization, loans are made tradable at the bond market. Large secondary markets are 
created for bond trading. Loan prices or issuers’ interest rates are the result of the daily trading 
and therefore fall under the market speculation concerning future inflation and economic 
growth figures as well as the debtor’s creditworthiness. While in the beginning, primarily corpo-
rate loans were converted into bonds; banks now increasingly create their own securities with-
out a link to the real economy, such as certificates and derivate based financial instruments. In 
the past years, financial institutions issued much more bonds and interest bearing securities 
than the states or the corporate sector (see fig. 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig 1: bond issuers ($-billion)1   Fig. 2: derivatives in relation to GDP2 
 
Higher margins can be achieved with securities that include options, because the price calcula-
tion is more difficult and therefore less transparent for investors. Originally, derivatives, such as 
options or futures were primarily used for hedging against business risks (for instance exchange 
rate risks or commodity price risk) by corporates. This has changed. The derivate market is dom-
inated by the fraction of market participants without a real business position, i.e. the specula-
tors. This circumstance can be documented with the development of the derivative in relation 
to the gross domestic product. The volume of closed derivatives by telephone trading between 
bank and institutional investor (over-the-counter trading) is nearly ten times greater than the 
                                                          
1
 Source of data: Bank for International Settlements, International and domestic debt securities, own calculations; 
2
 Source of data: Bank for International settlement concerning the OTC and exchange-traded derivatives, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund concerning world GDP figures (GDP based on current prices), own calculations. The total vol-
ume of exchange traded derivatives is even higher as the BIS-data does not include options and futures on com-
modities and single equity.  
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real economic output of all economies. The volume of exchange-traded derivatives is also a mul-
tiple of the world-GDP (see fig. 2). If the derivatives were only used to secure real economic risk 
positions, the trade volume should roughly correspond with the worldwide annual production 
of goods and services. Because companies do not hedge their risk positions multiple times. Con-
sequently, the fraction of derivatives used for purely speculative purposes and not for hedging 
of business risks, is more than 20 times the world-GDP. 
Most derivatives have the leverage effect as a common feature, which means that a rather 
small change in the market price of the underlying leads to much higher change in the derivative 
price. In other words, on derivatives with a slight capital expenditure, a high nominal capital can 
be moved and so a multiple of profit or loss is achieved in comparison to spot market instru-
ments. For the business model “bank”, large holdings of securities and derivatives on the asset 
side implicate a high daily volatility in assets values. These risky investments of banks, in com-
parison to those of industrial enterprises, are financed by a rather small fracture of equity capi-
tal on the liability side. Here again, on the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets, a leverage 
risk exists. Investment banks earn huge profits at high risk by working with a double leverage on 
the asset side as well as on the liability side. A clear indicator for the leverage effect is the in-
vestment banks’ return on equity, which lies above 20%, while the long-term average for real 
economic businesses lies between 10 and 12% (Bank for International Settlements, 2011).  
Packer and Tarashev (2011, p. 43) are writing in the June 2011 BIS quarterly report: „Another 
reason banks’ creditworthiness is especially hard to assess is that their earnings performance is 
highly volatile, not least because of structurally high leverage. For instance, on the back of lever-
age roughly five times that of firms in other sectors, the volatility of returns on banks’ stocks 
over the past several decades has been consistently higher than that of non-financial stocks.” 
The alteration of the business model has substantial macroeconomic implications. From an eco-
nomic perspective, the banking system has the task of financing the real economy. In their func-
tion as an intermediary, banks transform macroeconomic savings into real economic invest-
ments. For this task alone – and not for issuance and trading of securities – the central bank 
privileges them with cheap refinancing. Out of financing an investment in the real economy, a 
real added value develops for the corporation; the GDP rise as more goods and services are 
produced, employment increases and this leads finally to a higher social welfare for the society. 
Investments in a banking certificate imply that savings do not flow to the real economy, but re-
main in the nominal, monetary sector. Such an investment - with no link to the real economy - is 
mere self-purpose, because no real added value comes from it. Thus, one investor’s profit is the 
other’s loss, because it is a zero sum game and assets are only redistributed in the nominal 
sphere. On balance, the economy’s total assets remain unaltered if no real investment is fi-
nanced  (Flassbeck, 2010, p.25f.; Schulmeister, 2009 p.172f.).  
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With the investors’ herd behavior in financial markets, only the nominal value of assets rise, di-
vert more and more from its fair value, until a clear price adjustment occurs. The extreme asset 
price fluctuations, for example of currencies or of derivatives on commodities and foods hinder 
and destroy real economic investments and activities. In addition, the share of economic sav-
ings, which are invested in bank bonds, hedge funds, and certificates, so in the purely nominal 
sector, increases steadily in relation to real economic investments. Clearly, on short term per-
spective yields achieved by nominal investments are higher than those of real investments. 
However from an economic point of view, this inflow of scarce resources into the unproductive 
sector is a misallocation (“squander”), enforces the decoupling of financial economy from the 
real economy and increases the risk of financial crises. The market economy as a whole thereby 
becomes considerably more fragile and crises-prone.  
2.3. The corporate governance „bank“ failed   
The great losses and the threatening insolvency during the financial crisis document the mal-
function of the banks’ internal risk management and its surveillance by the supervisory board. 
Another critical aspect in respect to a lack of corporate governance by banks is the practice of 
awarding high bonuses to the management, even in times of crises. 
Responsible for this malfunction of banks’ internal risk management are the following factors: 
 Generally, the business model bank involves a nearly incalculable risk. Large holdings of 
securities and derivatives of various types, various markets and maturity on the asset 
side financed with a minimum of equity capital induce a risk complexity that cannot even 
be managed with help of the best risk models.  
 The estimates of market risk and credit risk are based on ex-post data and subjective as-
sumptions for future trends. The “Knightian uncertainty” as a factor, which cannot be 
calculated by mathematical models, remains existent.  
 The investment banks’ risk models focus merely on the risk of the own bank and do not 
include the systemic risk. This means, the domino effect, which results from the collapse 
of several banks, is not part of the risk observation.  
 The direct liquidity requirement of banks in the financial crisis, which results from not 
being able to sell securities in the market and the simultaneous collapse of the interbank 
money market as a refinancing source is only insufficiently, implemented in the banks’ 
risk models.  
The supervisory board’s job is to audit corporate policy and with that the risks taken by the 
management. Losses and threatening insolvency, de facto, document a failure in supervision. 
Positions on the board of directors, especially in banks with government involvement, are often-
times occupied by persons lacking the necessary expertise for the banking business. A lot of 
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times, individuals have a multiple number of mandates on boards of directors to work on, so 
that no effective control of corporate governance is guaranteed.  
Closely related to this, is the question of the liability of directors as well as of the management 
of corporations. According to Eucken, liability is a constituting principal of a market-based econ-
omy. Eucken (2004, p. 279f.) introduces the chapter about liability in his work “The Foundations 
of Economics” with the request “Wer den Nutzen hat, muß auch den Schaden haben (Who is 
the beneficiary must also have the damage)”.  
While private individuals and partnerships are directly liable, for capital corporations the corpo-
ration is liable as a separate legal entity. This legally limited liability to the entrepreneur’s assets 
causes a dilution of Eucken’s principal of liability, because the direct link between the manager’s 
economic decisions and the liability for economic consequences is not granted anymore. By 
German law, every board member of the public limited company is liable with their own per-
sonal assets according to §93 AktG, for damages to the company resulting from a violation of 
their duty of care. But on one hand it is not a violation, when, in the case of a corporate decision 
the board director could, on the grounds of appropriate information, reasonably assume that 
his action would benefit the wellbeing of the corporation (§93 AktG). And on the other hand, 
capital corporations usually have a professional liability insurance for the actions of their boards 
(so called “Directors and Officers Insurance (D&O)”), which insures negligence risks. Factually, 
no individual liability is created with this additional security for the boards’ misconduct in in-
vestment banks, even when their fault can be proven.   
The asymmetry between profits and damages is very distinct in investment banking. Salaries in 
the banking sector are much higher than in other corporate sectors. The main problem from a 
corporate governance perspective, in this case, is the variable compensation structures. The 
management’s bonus payments are oftentimes tied to short-term business successes (profit or 
stock price development), so that false incentives are set to take higher risks. Deals, that in-
crease the corporate success short-term, and then prove to be a high risk and debit factor for 
the bank long-term, are actively promoted this way. Good corporate governance, in the sense of 
sustainable corporate development, looks different. 
In their recommendation for sound compensation practices, the Financial Stability Forum (2009, 
p. 1) has especially emphasized the correlation between bonus payments and risk taking of bank 
management: “High short-term profits led to generous bonus payments to employees without 
adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their firms. These perverse incentives 
amplified the excessive risk-taking that severely threatened the global financial system and left 
firms with fewer resources to absorb losses as risks materialized. The lack of attention to risk al-
so contributed to the large, in some cases extreme absolute level of compensation in the indus-
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try.  ….. The Principles are intended to reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking that may 
arise from the structure of compensation schemes.” 
2.4. Banking supervision and control 
Basel II, the banking regulation on capital adequacy, initially published 2004, explicitly included 
the securitization and establishment of off-balance sheet transaction platforms, came too late. 
To avoid competitive disadvantages for a national banking system, such extensive reforms of 
the banking system occur on the basis of G20 agreements. The implementation of G20 regula-
tions in national banking law regularly occurs with a considerable time delay. In Europe, the im-
plementation was supposed to be finished in 2006, but due to exception rules etc. the imple-
mentation of Basel II just became effective in 2008. Too late to prevent the crisis. Although the 
US was substantially involved in creating the Basel II agreement, it was never implemented into 
US law (Cannata & Quagliariello, 2009, p. 14f.). Maybe the US now skips Basel II and directly im-
plements the reform of the reform, “Basel III”. 
Basel II is a good example for the problems of bank supervision. The supervising authority does 
not act, but rather reacts to dynamic developments in the banking sector or financial market 
late. The voting processes for the introduction of new banking regulation are extremely time 
consuming. Reform suggestions must come from national levels to be discussed on the G20-
level. Then after tedious negotiations about the details, a G20 agreement is reached. Finally, 
this agreement must then be implemented in national banking laws and to national regulatory 
authorities. 
The negations on the G20-level are so difficult, because they are characterized by a political 
struggle over competitive advantages for the national banking system. This nationalistic thinking 
in politics, in the bank supervision, as well as in national banking legislation strongly contradicts 
a global finance market and banks that act independently from national boundaries. In past 
decades, the finance market was liberalized, but the supervision and control of the market, the 
legislation and lastly the thinking of the politically active persisted on a national level. Naturally, 
this reflects politics’ limitless trust in the finance market or the market as a whole, which re-
quires only minimal control and supervision. 
When observing the set of Basel II regulations the complexity, the high level of detail and the 
extent of the policy become obvious. This complexity of regulations results from the ambition to 
create a possibly generally binding and unambiguous directive. The level of detail and the ruling 
of individual cases increase steadily from Basel I to Basel II to Basel III, so that in the end, the 
knowledge of these banking regulations can only be accessed by few experts. Nevertheless, in 
this competition between experts, banks will be the ones executing banking supervision. Be-
cause the long history bank crises documents the high innovative power of the finance markets 
in creating new financial instruments, which enable a legal way of bypassing bank supervision 
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and control. This competition is unfair, because the financial resources and with that the man-
power between private banks and official supervision are unevenly distributed. In the face of 
the high costs of banking supervision now and the rather low return, the society must question 
whether it wants to further participate in this competition over banking regulation. 
2.5. Mark-to-Market valuation – procyclic accounting 
As the EU-Commission has decided, European credit institutions have accounted for according 
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) since 2005. One groundbreaking change is 
the valuation of financial assets, documented in the trading book, by their market price, so 
called “mark to market” assessment or “fair value accounting”. Before, in the “Current Account-
ing Framework”, the acquisition value of an asset has been taken for valuation.  
This constraint to evaluate tradable assets with actual market prices involves high risks that 
were pointed out by Enria et al. (2004). As the development of US real estate prices demon-
strates, market prices certainly do not always represent the fair value, but rather underlie spec-
ulative exaggerations and are volatile. With the mark-to-market valuation of tradable assets 
speculation and volatility are taken into the bank’s balance sheet. Shareholders’ equity, profits 
and losses, tax payments, dividends and lastly the credit institutions’ solvency therefore reflect 
the market’s volatility. Wherefore, the balance sheet, the income statement, and the annual 
report of financial institutions only have little reliability and limited significance. 
Additionally, the market-oriented assessment of assets strengthens the speculative exaggera-
tion of the finance market in both directions, meaning that it has a procyclic effect. This is prov-
en in an empirical study about past financial crises by Adrian and Shin (2010). The functional 
chain can easily be comprehended. In the case of a mark-to-market valuation rising market pric-
es automatically increase the value of financial assets, causing the shareholders’ equity and 
profit to simultaneously increase on the liability side. Banks with higher equity capital can take 
up more loans and newly invest this capital at the finance market. The increased demand then 
again causes market prices to rise and so leads to steadily increase in banks’ profits and equity 
capital. Gratifications for bank management (bonus payments), the dividend disbursements to 
shareholders and the number of bank analysts’ recommendations to buy bank shares increase 
as well. The boom nourishes the boom. How else would it be possible for US-banks that were 
rescued by the government during the financial crisis, to pay back the high government grants 
within a short period of time after the crisis? With comparably modest revenues from financing 
real investments, such a turn of events from threatening insolvency to high profits is unexplain-
able. Naturally, banks that are especially active in investment banking have an advantage here. 
2.6. Rating – no independent and neutral assessment 
With the increasing sales-orientation of banks, as well as with growing complexity of financial 
products, there is a higher demand by investors for a “manufacturer-neutral” or bank-
11 
 
independent assessment by a third party. The three big rating-agencies Standard & Poor’s, 
Moddy’s, and Fitch, who are responsible for 95% of all ratings, perform this task, but rather in-
sufficiently. All three agencies are private, profit maximizing corporations, whose business is the 
assessment of credit risk of various kinds. To this extent, they are first and foremost liable to 
account to their shareholders. These are not investor or consumer protection organizations, 
which examine and attest the intrinsic value of stocks by government order, independently of 
economic interests as “Stiftung Warentest” (the German product testing foundation) does.  
Furthermore every rating is a subjective assessment and evaluation of available information. 
Even though rating models have a closed inner logic, relatively many assumptions about future 
development of the corporation specifically, as well as the entire corporate environment flow 
into the assessment.  
According to Packer and Tarashev (2011, p. 44.):  “Ratings are opinions about the creditworthi-
ness of a rated entity, be it a sovereign, an institution or a financial instrument. They reflect both 
quantitative assessments of credit risk and the expert judgment of a ratings committee. Thus, no 
rating can be unequivocally explained by a particular set of data inputs and formal rules.” 
In addition, the issuer of bonds, the one who has a direct economic interest in a “good” rating, is 
the one who pays the agencies for their services (so called “issuer-pay-model”). Especially lucra-
tive is the assessment of structured finance products that are based on the securitization of an 
extensive pool of assets. Depending on the complexity and volume of the asset pool, the agen-
cies receive between 300 000 and 500 000 Dollar for their ratings (Holmes, 1999). With that, the 
revenue from dealing with structured financings contributes significantly to the agencies corpo-
rate success.  
The constellation of market dominance, profit maximization, subjectivity and payment practice 
in ratings has notably contributed to the financial crisis. With the help of portfolio models bad 
credit risks were blandished and attested with good ratings. During the financial crisis, it turned 
out, that the fundamental model assumptions (correlation and covariance) were a great deal 
too optimistic and the bonds were rarely valuable. 2007, Moody’s reduced the ratings of 31% of 
all collateralized debt obligations. Of 94% of all the issued mezzanine tranches (structured 
bonds with a BBB to B rating) in 2006 and 2007, interest and redemption payments are not op-
erated anymore. 45% of all AAA rated senior-tranches are also insolvent (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2008, p. 14f.). This means, that the credit risk earlier attested as good has 
turned out to be a bad risk in retrospective.  
Liability claims against rating agencies based on their false assessment are difficult to enforce 
legally. To do so, a premeditation or gross error would have to be proven within the model. Hav-
ing a wrong opinion or a false evaluation about the fundamental risks is not indictable per se.  
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In terms of the ratings problem, it is also important, to observe the environment. The market 
participants align their actions with the ratings, so that a change of rating directly influences 
market development. In the case of a downgrade of a debtor’s credit quality, his refinancing 
costs rise immediately, through which a crisis situation of an entrepreneur or a country can in-
tensify further. The downrating therefore becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, acts procyclic to 
that extent and supports the prevailing herd behavior of investors. Through the daily trading 
with securitized loans long-term forecasts about the probability of a default become a short-
term play ball for the market. 
The meaning of ratings and so the influence of the agencies are additionally supported by the 
fact, that national legislation concerning bank supervision and regulation in many states, so far 
for example in the German banking act, KWG, are based explicitly on the risk assessment of pri-
vate rating agencies. This is hardly surprising, because the G20 agreement about banks’ capital 
adequacy (Basel II and Basel III directives) is also applicable to the assessment by external rating 
agencies. The European Central Bank too explicitly uses ratings as a standard for the minimum 
requirements of collateral deposited by commercial banks for refinancing. This is how laws, pro-
visions, and procedural regulations in the finance sector are implicitly based on the subjective 
assessment of three American corporations. 
2.7. Credit derivatives and other derivatives – „perverse world“ 
The example of credit derivatives demonstrates how the expanding market negatively affects 
the real economy. With the help of credit derivatives, the actual stream of payments (interest 
and redemption) of a loan can be separated from its default risk. Since this is an exchange of 
credit default risks, this most widely used credit derivate is called “credit default swap (CDS)”. 
Example: Bank A grants corporation B a loan and simultaneously gets insured for credit default 
by insurance C. As in any insurance, A, being the secured party, now pays C regular premiums 
and so is guaranteed to be compensated for his loss (nominal value of the loan) in case of B’s 
default. As opposed to traditional credit insurance, the credit derivate is tradable at the market 
due to an extensive standardization of contracts. Furthermore, the buyer of such a credit deri-
vate can insure the risk of credit default of B without even possessing a loan handed out to B. 
When taking up insurance, however, the insured party must possess the object to be insured.  
Many economists view the development of credit derivatives as positive, because in theory they 
enable an allocation of risks to economically strong corporations. But this opinion overlooks 
substantial disadvantages. The incentive structure in the credit business of banks changes fun-
damentally. In the traditional credit business, the bank has a considerable economic interest in 
the debtor’s solvency. When granting loans, the bank intensively examines the debtor’s credita-
bility and creditworthiness and requests a regular report about his economic development. 
When the bank sells the credit risk to a third party through a credit derivative, it has no more an 
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economic interest in carefully choosing debtors. Furthermore, the bank is not required to in-
form the borrower about the altered state of interest. 
This “lack of interest” can even make a debtor’s economic demise or the bankruptcy lucrative 
for the bank. In a settlement proceeding or a restructuring of company’s B debt, the bank A only 
receives parts of its claims against B back, whereas in case of a bankruptcy it receives 100% of 
its claims through the credit default swap from C. This is not the only case, as the bankruptcy of 
General Motors in 2009 shows. The creditors refused to agree to a settlement deal aimed for by 
the US-government and insisted on GM’s bankruptcy (Sender, 2009). 
In 1998 the CDS market volume estimated at $ 180 billion (the nominal value of the hedging 
volume), 2004 it was already at $ 6 trillion and in 2008 nearly ten times of that, at $ 57 trillion 
(Stulz, 2009, p. 13). With increasing liquidity and volume in the CDS market the bank’s decision 
about granting loans is influenced. Often a credit is only granted, when the risk can be sold, not 
otherwise. With that, the potential creditor’s economic situation becomes secondary as a varia-
ble for the bank’s credit decision. The same applies to the pricing of loans. The economic theory 
assumes that the price of the derivative is derived from the price of its underlying (basis price). 
That means the premium payment of the credit derivative results from the interest rate of the 
loan. But this is not the case in practice. Here, the more liquid market dominates the less liquid 
market. The market for credit derivatives demonstrates a much higher trade volume than the 
credit and bond markets, meaning that in the case of big corporate debtors, the price for the 
insurance of the credit risk at the CDS-market determines the interest rate for the loan. 
However, the derivate price for the credit risk does not result from the individual creditworthi-
ness assessment of the debtor but rather from daily trading with CDS at the financial market. It 
is volatile and shows speculative distortions. If the interest rate for the loan becomes a residual 
of credit derivative premiums, then the real economic use of capital, the entrepreneurial in-
vestment, becomes indirectly dependent on the development of speculative derivate prices. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank (2010, p. 58f.) has recently empirically proven the price-leadership of 
CDS compared to the loan market, but did not warn about the fatal economic consequences of 
this fact. 
Supporters of the credit derivatives emphasize the advantages of optimal allocation of risks in 
the economy. The idea is that credit derivatives enable the transfer of risks to potent and pow-
erful market participants. But the financial crisis shows, that exactly this was not the case. With 
AIG, a US insurance company has taken over default risks amounting to 562 billion dollar in 
2007 with the sale of CDS, which brought them to the edge of a collapse when the insured event 
occurred in 2008. Only with a bailout package of altogether 182 billion dollar from the US gov-
ernment, AIG could be saved from insolvency. AIG especially sold CDS to buyers of structured 
bonds and with that secured the default of interest and redemption payments. Just like the 
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credit risk of these bond constructions was falsely assessed with a good rating, the premium 
payment of CDS was estimated too low. AIG, as opposed to banks and hedge funds, actually 
took over the credit default risk and only sold CDS unilaterally (ISDA, 2009). Contrary to AIG, 
Banks and hedge funds covered immediately every open risk position from a CDS trade with a 
reverse risk position. Had AIG really defaulted as a liable payer, the carousel business of the re-
ciprocal buying and selling of CDS by banks and hedge funds would have also collapsed, because 
this deal requires, that each party complies with its obligations and that no party defaults. In 
such a carousel business the default of a single contractual party could already bring the entire 
finance system to a downfall in a sort of domino effect. The systemic risk because of the recip-
rocal linkage of the financial institutions from the buying and selling of CDS is very high. The 
previously portrayed business model of banks and hedge funds has nothing to do with the eco-
nomic desirable optimal allocation of risks to economic subjects that are capable of carrying 
such risks. 
The above statements can respectively be applied to other derivative markets. The trade vol-
ume of commodities or oil in forward markets is a multiple of its trade volume in spot markets. 
As in the case of credit derivatives, the forward market price determines the price formation in 
the spot market. Paradoxically, not the manufacture or production costs determine the price, 
but rather the speculative price development at option and future markets. The price trend in a 
purely nominal sphere determines the economic efficiency of production processes in the cor-
porate sector. 
3. Status quo of financial market reforms in Europe 
3.1. European finance supervision – new institutional structures 
The financial crisis revealed considerable weaknesses of the European finance supervision. In 
the beginning of the crisis, individual European member states acted isolated, with their own 
national bailout plans for “their” banks as well as national economic stimulus packages. There 
was a great lack of cooperation between supervising authorities as well as no superior estab-
lishment for coordinating rescue activities. Following the insight, that a liberalized, global fi-
nance market also needs supranational supervision structures, the EU used the crisis to create 
European finance supervision with own institutions and responsibilities. 
Since 2011, the supervision on the micro level is the responsibility of the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS), which consists of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in London, 
the European Supervisory Authority (Insurance and Occupational Pensions) (EIOPA) in Frankfurt, 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESA) in Paris. While the general execution 
of the supervision remains the task of national institutions of EU member states, the new Euro-
pean roof institutions “….. will be built on shared and mutually reinforcing responsibilities, com-
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bining nationally based supervision of firms with centralisation of specific tasks at the European 
level so as to foster harmonised rules as well as coherent supervisory practice and enforcement. 
(European Commission, 2009, p. 3).” To obtain national sovereignty, the new European institu-
tions are hardly equipped with authority and powers to direct. Only in case of a crisis, the Euro-
pean supervisor has the right of initiative to intervene in national sovereignty. 
European financial supervision 
Micro-prudential approach 
Macro-prudential 
Approach 
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 
European Systemic 
Risk Council 
(ESRC) 
European Banking 
Authority (EBA) 
European Insurance 
and Occupational 
Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) 
European Securities 
Authority (ESA) 
 
To recognize future risks early for the stability of the financial sector, an Economic Systemic Risk 
Council (ESRC) is installed. It is its task, to investigate potential risks for the stability of the fi-
nance system on the macro level and send out warnings and recommendations to national and 
European supervision institutions as early as possible. With the creation of a central authority in 
Europe for macroeconomic analyses, the research power of national institutions and supervising 
authorities, which are fragmented into resources until now, are supposed to be bundled. In 
general, the analysis of macroeconomic aspects becomes a much more important factor, than it 
was before the crisis. Even though, the, at the ECB located, ESRC does not have any explicit legal 
authority, its warnings and recommendations should nevertheless have substantial political in-
fluence, yet through the involvement of all EU central banks and the EU supervising authorities. 
3.2. Reforms of the banking system 
Despite the short period of time, numerous reforms were introduced in the banking sector. An 
overview of them will be given below: 
 
Stress tests 
The newly created European Banking Authority (EBA) has been conducting annual stress tests 
since 2009 for European banks. With this, the Europeans are following the US role model to test 
the risk bearing ability of individual banks under the assumption of negative developments of 
the entire market environment. In case of a simulated decrease of economic growth, as well as 
rising interest rates in the money market and in the capital market, the bank’s equity capital 
(hard core capital, common equity tier 1) must not fall under the 5% mark. With the publication 
of the results of stress tests, transparency is supposed to be improved and to strengthen the 
market participants’ trust in the European banking sector. 
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Basel III 
As a reaction to the financial crisis, the Basel committee for bank supervision has passed a new 
capital adequacy and liquidity requirements for banks, the so called “Basel III-directive”, which, 
as a G20 agreement, is being implemented in national banking law step by step. Basel III is sup-
posed to come into effect 2013. With Basel III, the existing capital adequacy requirements for 
banks in Basel II guidelines are successively being tightened. In addition, a wider risk spectrum is 
covered and current regulations are complemented by macroprudential aspects of the banking 
system stability (Bank for International Settlements, 2011, p. 75f.): 
 Aside from the higher quote for core capital to be hold by banks, its quality also im-
proves. 
 To set a link between equity capital and the bank’s business risk as a whole, a maximum 
borrowing rate (so called “leverage ratio”) is introduced together with Basel III. The rate 
is derived from the relation of a bank’s core capital to its assets plus off balance deals 
and derivatives. 
 Threatening losses from the bank’s own trading book are supposed to be covered by 
higher capital deposits for less solvent, credit risk sensitive assets in the future.  
 Stricter capital requirements concerning the counterparty risk will prospectively apply 
for OTC derivatives. With that, Basel III sets the incentive for banks to increasingly trade 
derivatives on central clearing platforms in the future and so to reduce the systemic risk 
in the banking sector.  
 Lacking solvency was a central problem for banks in the financial crisis. That is why Basel 
III on one hand leads to a minimum liquidity rate (the “liquidity coverage ratio”, LCR) and 
on the other hand to a structural liquidity rate (“net stable funding ratio”, NSFR). 
 The problem of the bank regulation’s procyclicality in its reaction on the real economic 
development is supposed to be solved by the introduction of capital cushions. In eco-
nomically “good” times, banks must hold more equity capital than dictated by the mini-
mum requirements. This builds a capital holding cushion for bad times.  
 
Capital requirements for global, system relevant banks (G-SIBs) 
For the coordination and enforcement of G20 agreements, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
was founded in 2009. The FSB submitted a regulation concept for global system relevant institu-
tions in 2010. Subsequently, financial institutions that are categorized by the FSB as system rel-
evant according to their size, network, global importance and complexity, should also be able to 
bear greater losses. To secure this ability of absorbing higher losses, the deposit of additional 
equity capital of 1% to 2.5% is demanded from these system relevant banks. Meaning, that 
Banks must hold more core capital than Basel III requires them to. These additional equity re-
quirements must successively be met by the banks from January 2016 until the end of 2018 at 
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latest. To solve the “moral hazard problem” of systemic relevance, the striving for banks for an 
even higher level of systemic relevance than achieved already will be punished with an addi-
tional surcharge of another 1% equity capital deposition. 
 
More effective cross-border bank resolution 
During the financial crisis, a master plan for the liquidation of defaulting banks did not exist, so 
that a liquidation would have been possible without simultaneously taking the risk of endanger-
ing the finance system’s stability altogether. This systemic risk “bank” is supposed to be crossed 
by the elaboration of institution specific emergency plans. By the end of 2011, the FSB will de-
velop a concept for resolution of globally active financial institutions, which will be implemented 
in national banking law as a G20 agreement (Financial Stability Board, 2011, p. 3). The EU com-
mission too sees the necessity to act here and already has consulted about the technical details 
of enabling possible framework regulations in the field of bank restructuring and liquidation 
(European Commission, 2011).  
 
Germany, with its laws on bank restructuring (RStruktG), which came into effect, in 2011, has 
already quickly pressed forward on a national level. This set of laws essentially contains three 
elements:  
1. It regulates a two-level process for recapitalizing and reorganizing credit institutions. 
These processes give the bank management an instrument with which to find its own so-
lutions without the involvement of banking supervision with its measures. Recapitaliza-
tion and reorganization require reaching a consensus between the supervision authority, 
credit institution and debtors (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011b).  
2. If this is not the case, the RStruktG offers the federal financial supervision authority (BaF-
in) the possibility of a transferal command as an administrative measure, as long as the 
finance system’s stability is endangered. A credit institution’s assets including its obliga-
tions can be partly or entirely transferred to a different legal entity with the transfer 
command.  
3. Commercial banks are obligated to deposit an annual contribution, which amount de-
pends on the profit situation, in a restructuring fund. The fund is meant to collect €70 
billion, while expecting an annual contribution of €1 billion (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2011b). 
 
Legislative regulations of bank internal compensation systems 
In 2009, the FSB developed fundamental principles for sound compensation systems (Financial 
Stability Forum, 2009) simultaneously established standards for implementation. According to 
these, the compensation is to be more closely connected to long-term and sustainable corpo-
rate success, whereby the risks taken must also be taken into consideration (Shlomo & Nguyen, 
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2011, p. 25). Likewise, supervising organs are supposed to be involved more closely in the de-
velopment and control of bank compensation systems. In addition, payment structures are 
meant to be modeled sufficiently transparent in the future. 2010, the EU reacted by comple-
menting the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD III) by principles for financial institutions’ com-
pensation systems (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2010). With the institution 
compensation regulation (InstitutsVergV), which causes an alteration of the banking act (KWG), 
these requirements by the FSB and European commission were enshrined in German law Octo-
ber 2010.  
  
Improved corporate governance of financial institutions 
2010, the EU commission has carried out consultation proceedings for improved corporate gov-
ernance of financial institutions and published a Green Book about this (European Commission, 
2010a). In it, especially the functions of the board of directors, of external auditors, and of su-
pervising authorities in the financial crises are critically illuminated and essential deficits are 
documented. Usually, a legal bill by the EU commission follows a consultation proceeding. This 
however has not occurred to date (July 2011). Since the EU commission is currently conducting 
consultation proceedings for corporations’ corporate governance, a legislative proposal by the 
EU can be expected shortly for all European limited companies, including financial institutions. 
3.3. Regulation of the OTC derivative market 
According to a G20 agreement from April 2009, by the end of 2012 all standardized, over-the-
counter (OCT) derivatives must be centrally documented and traded with central counterparties 
(CCPs). To decrease the domino effect or the system risk in case of an OTC contractual partner’s 
default, the CCP acts as a contracting party for the buyer as well as for the seller of derivatives. 
For this, market participants must deposit sufficient collateral at the central clearing house in 
the future. If derivatives are still traded over the counter and not by a central counterparty, 
banks must deposit much more equity capital in the future based on Basel III.  
According to Heller and Vause (2011, p. 68), the majority of transactions at the derivate market 
are traded over the counter between financial institutions, where the risk is not sufficiently cov-
ered by the bank’s equity capital: At present, central clearing covers approximately 50% of the 
$400 trillion of outstanding interest rate swaps (IRS), 20–30% of the $2.5 trillion of outstanding 
commodity derivatives and a little under 10% of the $30 trillion of outstanding credit default 
swaps (CDS). 
 
The EU has implemented the G20 regulations in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR). The newly created European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) will establish a 
central transaction registry and in the future there will be an obligation to register derivative 
transactions (European Commission, 2010b). 
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In relocating the system risk on to central counterparties, it must be guaranteed, that the cen-
tral contracting party itself is always solvent and complies with its payment obligations. A de-
fault by the CCP must absolutely be prevented. Consequently the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) has, in cooperation with the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), formulated fundamental requirements for the equity base, liquidity, business model 
and corporate risks of CCPs (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 2011).  
3.4. Regulation of rating agencies 
With an EU regulation concerning rating agencies, a unanimous regulation framework is created 
for the supervision and control of rating agencies active within the EU. Since 2011, rating agen-
cies must register business activities within the EU at the ESMA and with that comply with the 
European requirements. Rating agencies based outside of the EU are supposed to be obligated 
to form subsidiaries within the EU. With this new directive, national supervising authorities now 
have the right to examine rating agencies, even without a concrete occasion, at any time.  
The EU regulations roughly correspond with the IOSCO code of conduct for rating agencies 
(International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2004). According to this code of conduct, 
rating agencies must in the future reveal the fundamental assessment models and assumptions 
for their ratings. Additionally, the manner of the change of assessment due to changes in certain 
parameters of the model must be documented by a sensitivity analysis. Each rating is to be ex-
amined annually. The rating agencies’ independence among others is supposed to be strength-
ened by a rotation system for an agency’s analysts and employees. In addition, the rating agen-
cy’s board of directors and administrative board must, to one third at least, consist of inde-
pendent members. The directors and administrative boards’ independent members’ compensa-
tion is not supposed to depend on the rating agency’s economic success. To avoid conflicts of 
interest, the agencies are not permitted advisory tasks, especially with respect to the establish-
ment of structured financial instruments (European Union, 2009). Ratings for structured finan-
cial products are to be labeled as such by suitable symbols in the future. 
The EU additionally carried out a consultation procedure late 2010 about the further proceed-
ings with rating agencies. Possible alternatives to the “issuer pay model” and the establishment 
of a public rating agency by the European community were discussed there. Here another legis-
lative bill by the EU in 2011 is still possible. 
3.5. Regulation of the shadow banking system 
With the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFM) from June 2011, the EU con-
stitutes unanimous requirements for the approval of and the supervision over alternative in-
vestment fund managers. The term “alternative investment fund, AIF” covers organizations for 
joint investments, which get capital from professional investors to invest it according to a specif-
ic strategy for the investors. In fact, all forms of collective capital investments can be subsumed 
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under this term, so long as they are not retail mutual investment funds. This guideline is espe-
cially applicable to hedge, private equity and real estate funds. It focuses on alternative fund 
managers, legal entities that run the fund business and the individual fund itself. The AIFM di-
rective has to be implemented in national law by EU member states within 2 years (Weitnauer, 
2011, p. 144f.).  
 Prospectively, an approval obligation exists for AIFs. Connected to this are minimum re-
quirements for equity capital and the experience and knowledge of fund managers. With 
the approval, the AIF receives an EU-pass, which permits EU-wide activities.  
 Within the fund management, it is to be strictly distinguished between risk and portfolio 
management in the future. The compensation system should be transparent and ade-
quately fitting to the size of the fund and the complexity of the management. Also, the 
compensation practice should be in line with solid risk management and should not neg-
atively affect the risk behavior of individuals.  
 In the future, a regular assessment of asset values and fund values should occur. Addi-
tionally, the deposit-bank-principle - known from retail mutual funds – is introduced. 
Meaning there is an independent holding authority for the assets of the fund, which will 
simultaneously be a control institution for payment streams and valuation. 
 With respect to the demanded transparency, the obligation to publish a detailed annual 
report with a balance of all liquefiable assets, list of revenues and expenditures, and the 
disclosure of compensation structures is introduced. 
Hedge fund managers also have to verify the adequacy and compliance of debt boundaries 
of the administrated AIFs. For private equity funds, there is prospectively an obligation to in-
form the supervising authority when equity quotes of not publicly traded corporations over 
10% are bought or sold. To impede the destruction of corporations or the sale of corpora-
tion parts by the private equity corporation (so called “asset stripping”), the AIFM directive 
envisages a prohibition period of 24 months for the sale after gaining control of the corpora-
tion through the AIF. 
4. Technocracy versus regulatory policy 
Politics reacted to the financial crisis with a number of new laws, directives, regulations and in-
stitutions for regulating the finance market. The deregulation and liberalization of the finance 
market, a process, which began with Margaret Thatcher in Europe and Ronald Reagan in the 
USA in the 1980’s, belongs in the past. With the legal bills discussed above, each segment and 
every institution of the finance market are to be regulated. This turn from an extensive deregu-
lation to a complete regulation of the finance system takes only three years. Additionally it must 
be emphasized, that these are not national solo runs, but that instead the majority of regula-
tions are based on international agreements by the G20 community of states. The origin, here, 
21 
 
is an international consensus about the necessity of the finance market’s regulation. This poses 
the question, how it is possible to initiate such a multitude of laws and international directives 
to regulate the finance market within such a short period of time, while the international com-
munity of states has not come to a consensus for just as socially relevant topics like global 
warming or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), even after many years of nego-
tiating.  
The previously discussed regulations of the finance system are aimed at increasing the system’s 
stability as such and to prevent another collapse. But in the previous 30 years of deregulation, 
structures have evolved at the finance market, which prove to be counterproductive for the real 
economy and present a risk as well as a stress factor on a community’s welfare. The regulation-
attempts indeed improve the system’s safety; do not, however, change its fundamental struc-
tures. The reforms are altogether system conform “repair measures” and cement the portrayed 
without getting to the core of the problem. This explains, why it was possible to come to an 
agreement on the international level in such a short period of time. When the finance system, 
despite all structural and institutional deficits, is not doubted in its foundations, and only details 
in the interaction of institutional players are altered, it is easy to find a broad consensus. 
What would be the obvious solution to the phenomenon “too big to fail”? The size reduction of 
financial institutions. Banks could be split into small to medium sized business units, either by 
business type or by region. The rescue of banks with public resources here offers the state or 
the federal regulatory policy various design options. Additional capital requirements for system 
relevant banks or the development of plans for resolution or liquidation of defaulting banks do 
not solve this problem, but merely treat the symptoms. In this sense, the German way of creat-
ing restructuring funds with bank charges, so that future defaulting measures can be financed 
out of the fund, does not appear very sensible. These regulating measures cannot eliminate the 
system risk, but merely secure it.  
What would be the obvious solution for the risk of a collapse of the economy’s credit supply in 
case of a bank crisis? One changes the business model of banks and separates the lending and 
deposit business, which is important for the real economy, from the risky investment banking 
business. With this institutional separation, comparable with the American Glass-Steagall Act 
from 1933, the real economy’s financing is secured. Only those commercial banks involved in 
financing the real economy earn the privilege of cheap central bank financing. Basel III, on the 
other hand, tries to reduce that risk from investment banking activities, instead of solving the 
problem. Indirectly, Basel III substantiates the current business model bank. A business model, 
which presents a risk for the financial stability as well as for society. 
Knowing, that derivative-trade has negative effects on the real economy and the finance sys-
tem, the trade of derivatives, as a result of pure speculative nature, should be prohibited. Credit 
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derivatives are counterproductive for the credit business and therefore to be generally prohib-
ited. The regulations for the derivative market, meanwhile, strive for the development of an ex-
tensive system of central clearing parties for the derivative trade. With that, a state supervised 
infrastructure is created for speculative derivative trading and facilitates it. The risk for the fi-
nance system is reduced, but the serious disadvantages of speculative trading for the real econ-
omy remain. With standardizing futures contracts concerning central clearinghouses, even an 
increase of trade volume of derivatives is probable.  
The above listing could be continued for the reform efforts in terms of rating agencies, hedge 
funds and private equity funds. Lastly, the reforms are lacking the regulatory policy’s creative 
drive to remove the structural deficits and fundamentally change the system of the finance 
market. When thinking merely system inherently, all the reforms presented can objectively be 
justified and demonstrate a complete logic in themselves. Noticeable is the high degree of de-
tail, which requires expert knowledge for legislation, supervision and control, as well as on the 
bank side. In the sense of a “technocracy”, a sort of objective necessities legislature and organi-
zational determination dominate over the political assessment of social benefits and disad-
vantages of finance institutions and instruments, for present reforms in the finance sector 
(Lübbe, 1998). This may not be surprising, because the legislative proposals all come from ex-
perts from the FSB, the BIS, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national central banks; 
institutions that are suspended from society’s or national parliaments’ democratic control, be-
cause of their supranational status (Roberts, 2010, p. 557).  
To complete the assessment of the status quo in the regulation of the finance market, one more 
aspect must be pointed out: the majority of new regulations, the complexity and their great lev-
el of detail will increase the costs of finance market supervision immensely. This is especially the 
case in Europe. Because, despite the new founded centralized European institutions for security 
markets, banks, and insurances, the national sovereignty of EU member states in bank legisla-
tion and finance market supervision still remains. Opposite to these high public costs of finance 
market regulation only stands a small social benefit.  
On the bank side, too, the reform’s realization will create considerable costs. In a widely oligop-
olistic banking sector, a rolling over of costs for charges and higher interest margins from fi-
nance institutions on to customers is to be feared. Therefore, from an economic perspective, 
each citizen pays twice for the finance market reform, as a taxpayer and as bank customer.  
5. Modern finance architecture without banks 
The institutional separation between investment banking and commercial banking and the pro-
hibition of derivative trading out of purely speculative motives are reforms of the finance sector 
for a transition phase to new structures. The finance sector’s reform efforts must not come to a 
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halt at the divestiture of what presently persists and a prohibition of activities and finance 
products, but instead, new and more efficient forms of economic intermediation of capital as 
the conventional banking business must be created.  
To establish a vision for future structures at the finance market, the historic lines of the banking 
sector’s development must merely be continued. With the introduction of bank loans’ securiti-
zation in the 1970’s, the bank gave up its intermediary position and became advisor and seller 
of securities. Capital providers and demanders are now directly connected as buyer and emitter 
of bonds. This ongoing disintermediation process was continued in the 1980’s with the creation 
of off balance transaction platforms for securitization. The credit derivatives’ upcoming devel-
opment in 1990’s yet refined this general trend toward disintermediation and decentralization 
in the banking sector (Lenz, 2009).  
This trend must now be continued in regulatory and economic politics: The web-based transfer-
al of capital over Internet platforms will replace conventional banks step-by-step as an interme-
diary. That the web-based “peer-to-peer lending (P2P)” works successfully is documented by 
credit-platforms like “smava” in Germany, “Prosper” in the US, and “Zopa” in the UK.  
Peer-to-peer lending over a web-based transfer-platform has vital advantages for the “players”:  
 P2P-lending is attractive for the investors (creditor) as well as for the credit user (debt-
or), because they can share the bank margin, meaning the difference between deposit 
and loan rates. The platform receives merely a transferal commission. These charges are 
much lower than the bank margin, because they do not have to finance fancy skyscrap-
ers at great locations or bonus payments for investment bankers. 
 The platform only takes over the transferal and does not enter into a contractual posi-
tion. Hence, there is no systemic risk, because risks are now peripherally distributed 
throughout the users.  
 In turn, investors can diversify the default risk by getting involved in various financing 
projects with small sums or by joining investor groups via the Internet. 
 Money’s undefeatable homogeneity makes it into a product, which is ideally suited for 
web-based transferals. The advances of information technologies can fully realize its 
economic benefits here. On the transaction platform, the application of information 
technologies will clearly increase the transparency, the competition and also the mobili-
ty of capital, in comparison to the oligopolistic bank market. Better transparency, in-
creased competition and last but not least, the cessation of bank margins, reduce capital 
costs and simultaneously simplify accessing capital. From an economic standpoint, these 
advantages have the potential for a quantum leap within the economic growth of partic-
ipating market economies.  
24 
 
 Increased transparency, central processing, and documentation within the transaction 
platform considerably simplify controlling and supervising finance market transactions. 
The extensive public resources that have been used for controlling banks so far can now 
alternately be used to protect investors.  
Similarly, as in the securitization of large corporate loans, the web-based transferal enables the 
mobilization of high capital volume by bringing together numerous savers. The credit default 
risk, too, is broken up into small amounts and spread throughout the mass of capital providers. 
But as opposed to how it is in securitization, in p2p-lending, loans are not tradable as bonds at 
the market. With that, capital providers and borrowers devote themselves to a fixed capital 
commitment with each transaction, where the interest and capital commitment period can vary 
depending on the maturity chosen. With this inability to trade, the economy’s credit supply is 
withdrawn from the daily speculation of the bond market and therefore receives a long-term 
stabilizing element. In this sense, it is important to guarantee the use of capital for real econom-
ic investments. Exclusively, individuals and commercial enterprises are acceptable borrowers. 
Financial institutions, such as banks, hedge funds, or private equity funds are excluded from the 
use of P2P-lending.  
In the majority of European countries, the economic success and therefore extending peer-to-
peer lending is so far blocked by tight legal supervising guidelines for practicing the banking 
business. For example, according to the German KWG, no banking license is required for the 
mere transfer of credits, however, bank business can be subject to authorization, especially with 
respect to platform-users as credit providers and deposit banking on the borrowers’ side. There-
fore the BaFin, the German banking supervision authority, examines each individual case 
(Mitschke, 2007). Consequently, the legal position in Germany is not very concrete. Comparable 
to for instance Basel III regulation there should be a G20 agreement about standards and super-
vision for internet-based credit transfers.  
In a place of legal certainty, the P2P-market will in the future guarantee the economy’s credit 
supply. A multitude of multinational enterprises will operate transaction platforms for capital 
transferal. Predestined for this, are corporations with Internet sales departments and a large 
client base, such as Amazon or Ebay. The market could also be of interest for providers of com-
munication technologies like IBM or Apple and telecommunication corporations like Deutsche 
Telekom AG or AT&T. In the corresponding legal realm and under sufficient supervision, capital 
transfer would be possible through social networks like Facebook or Linkedin. With respect to 
the financial knowledge and the extent of the customer base, banks could also operate the 
transferal platform, as long as a strict institutional separation from conventional banking busi-
ness is provided.  
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The finance market of the future consists of a network of regional commercial banks that pro-
cess payment transactions and grant loans to regional customers. Parallel to this, there are a 
multitude of web-based transaction platforms for the transferal of capital. This global world of 
finance will, however, function without banks, because for the mere transferal of capital no lo-
cal “players” are needed. 
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